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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. June, 1918. Il Processo di Socrate (pp. 241-268): F. Kiesow. - The best account of Socrates's condemnation is given by Plato in his Apology. L'ordine artistico (pp. 269-285): M. DE WULF. - The pleasure caused by a work of art is due to the elements of unity and multiplicity harmoniously combined. Mazzini filosofo (pp. 286-294): Francesco OLGIATI. - A study of the life and of the political ideals of Giuseppe Mazzini. L'assolutezza delle massime morali (pp. 295-307): U. A. PADOVANI. - Moral law is one and immutable in so far as God is concerned. For us, however, it varies according to times and circumstances. Analise d'opere. George A. Coe, The Psychology of Religion: A. Gemelli. E. Peillaube, L'introduction de la scolastique dans l'enseignement secondaire: A. GEMELLI. Alessandro Levi, Bibliografia filosofica italiana: A. Gemelli. Aristotele, Politica: Leon-IDA BIANCHI. Luigi Perego, I nuovi valori del diritto penale. F. Kiesow, Il daimonion di Socrate: A. Levi. Notiziario.

- Parker, G. H. The Elementary Nervous System. Monographs on Experimental Biology. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1919. Pp. 229. \$2.50.
- Sorley, W. R. Moral Values and the Idea of God. Cambridge: The University Press. New York: G. P. Putnams Sons. 1919. Pp. xix + 534. \$500.

NOTES AND NEWS

DEWEY'S LECTURES IN JAPAN

In the months of February and March Professor John Dewey delivered a course of eight lectures at the Imperial University at Tokyo on "Problems of Philosophic Reconstruction." The following is the syllabus prepared for the audience to which the lectures were addressed. We understand the lectures are to be printed in Japanese. It is to be hoped that Professor Dewey will publish them in English at his earliest convenience.

LECTURE I

CONFLICTING IDEAS AS TO THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

T.

The Origins of Philosophy. 1. Since man is primarily a being of desire and imagination, his primary beliefs spring from his hopes and

fears, successes and failures, rather than from observation; they are poetic and religious, rather than scientific. 2. These ideas when fixed and organized under community tradition and authority became the material out of which philosophy developed.

II.

Positive or Matter-of-Fact Knowledge. 1. Information regarding nature, and the natural conditions and consequences of human acts, is necessary to life. This knowledge grows up around the practical arts which give to man the use of the natural environment. 2. After a time the incongruity between this knowledge and the body of emotional beliefs is so great, that some reconciliation is sought for. Then philosophy proper arises. This fact is illustrated in the development of both Greek, medieval, and modern German philosophies. Matter-of-fact knowledge is (i) specific, limited, hard and cold; (ii) accurate and quantitative, and useful; and (iii) consists of tested facts; while poetic and traditional beliefs are (i) universal and comprehensive; (ii) qualitative, vague, but socially fundamental; and (iii) concerned with meanings and values rather than with facts. Hence arise

III.

The Chief Traits of Classic Philosophy. It is (i) apologetic and "compensatory"; (ii) formal and rigorously systematic, or dialectical; (iii) concerned with the difference between absolute, universal Reality and Knowledge and that which is relative, partial and empirical.

IV.

The Newer Idea of Philosophy. This (i) recognizes the impossibility of reconciling the traditional beliefs with modern scientific developments, and (ii) recognizes the origin of philosophic questions and interests in social conflict and needs, and hence conceives of philosophy as an organ or instrument of social direction.

LECTURE II

KNOWLEDGE AS CONTEMPLATIVE AND ACTIVE

T.

Contemplative Philosophy. 1. Man forms pictures of an ideal world by conceiving a state of things in which only the satisfactory or complete exists. Reflection analyzes the features of such a world, and finds them to be permanence, unity and harmony, and thus creates a noumenal real-ideal realm of being.—Plato. 2. In contrast, the existent and evil empirical world is one of multiplicity, partiality

and change. The primary function of philosophy is to lead the mind from belief in this world to contemplation of the ideal-real world. This contemplation leaves the phenomenal world unchanged, but assimilates the mind to true Reality. Aristotle's theory of true knowledge and its influence.

II.

Active Philosophy. 1. Its "realistic" phase consists in willingness to study and to take into account existing facts, regarded as obstacles and means in achieving desired changes. They are not treated as things to be escaped from nor yet to be acquiesced in. Direction of change is the great problem. 2. Its "idealistic" phase consists in cultivating suggestions, ideas, or ideal possibilities and meanings as methods and plans for transforming and improving existing conditions. Forecast of a better future is the pragmatic substitute for the noumenal world in contemplative philosophy. Ideal meanings are thus not separate or ultimate, but are instrumental and need to be tested by consequences.

III.

The Special Function of Active Philosophy. While the function of all knowledge is to rectify troubles, that of the sciences is technical, while that of philosophy is social and human or moral. Why knowledge is objective, impersonal and universal. Philosophy is comprehensive and ultimate in the moral sense of going below prejudices, traditions and purposes which divide classes, races and peoples and trying to discover moral adjustments.

LECTURE III

Social Causes of Philosophic Reconstruction

The two previous lectures have dealt with the contrast of the classic and the modern conceptions of the nature and function of philosophy. The next two consider the reasons for the growth of the newer point of view, the present one dealing with the more general historical and social factors, the next with the more special scientific factors.

T.

The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. This may be taken as exemplifying the transition from the classic to the modern point of view. It had for its chief features the ideas that: 1. Knowledge is power, not contemplation. Yet this knowledge is obtained only by "obeying nature," not by "anticipating" her. 2. This knowledge can be

obtained only through cooperative and organized research, not by mere individual ability which results only in disputations or ornamental knowledge. 3. The end of knowledge is the relief and improvement of the human estate.

II.

Social Factors in This Point of View. 1. Industrial, matter-of-fact activity and invention had reached a point where the idea of constant and systematic progress through control of natural forces was possible. Travel, exploration, discovery of a new world. 2. The beginning of the break-down of feudal class divisions, and the rise of national states with a corresponding release of the individual from the bonds of custom. The contract theory of the origin of the state. 3. The beginnings of freedom of criticism and conscience in matters of religious belief and worship. Belief in the power of Reason and Thought was transferred from the conception of the formation of the Universe at large to concrete things and human institutions. Idealism ceased to be cosmic and objective and became in Bacon's successors individual and subjective.

LECTURE IV

MODERN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHIC RECONSTRUCTION

The growth of science since the seventeenth century has revolutionized our ideas of (I.) Nature and (II.) the Method of Knowing.

I.

The Contrast as to Nature. 1. The classic view, formulated by Aristotle and adopted by medieval thought, held (1) that nature is a closed whole, finite, and composed of parts qualitatively different, and arranged in a hierarchy of higher and lower; and (2) that there are a definite number of fixed classes or species, each having its own immutable form which controls its movements and growth, so that (3) individuals which change and perish are real only as members of fixed and universal classes. 2. The modern view asserts (1) the infinity, uniformity and homogeneity of Nature, thus substituting a democracy of elements for an aristocracy of classes, (2) that motion and change are more important than fixity and (3) the universal subordinate to individuals.

TT.

The Contrast as to Method of Knowing. 1. Classic method emphasized the importance of definition, demonstration, and syllogistic reasoning—the inclusion of particulars within the conception of the class. Sense perception was knowledge of perishing particulars and

had to be subsumed under the rational knowledge of conceptions. 2. Modern science is interested in inquiry and discovery rather than proof, and hence insists upon experimental analysis of all sense observations, and the experimental verification of all general ideas which are regarded as only hypotheses till verified by experimental production of individuals. Control of change is both the object and the test of knowing. Pragmatically, infinity is equivalent to possibility of indefinite progress.

III.

Effect upon Philosophy. For a considerable period, the effect of the change was limited to physical matters and hence was technical and industrial rather than humane and moral; or, in the latter region, the influence was skeptical rather than constructive. Now the influence is extended to the moral and social.

LECTURE V

THE CHANGED CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE AND REASON I.

Earlier History of the Notion of Experience. 1. To Plato and Aristotle, experience meant an accumulation and gradual organization of a multitude of particular acts and perceptions into a kind of practical insight and ability, like that of the builder or physician. The "empirical" versus the scientific. 2. The early modern, British, notion of experience was under the influence of sensational psychology, and eliminated all traits of organization save those supplied by casual association and blind habit. It was a powerful tool of skeptical criticism, but was impotent for construction.

II.

The Earlier History of the Notion of Reason. It was framed to meet the weaknesses in the current idea of experience. 1. To the Greek philosophers, Reason was the faculty of insight into the universal, the law, cause or principle, which was the only source of scientific explanation and demonstration and of sure direction of conduct. Historically, this "rationalism" became formal, the source of neglect of empirical observation, and the originator of a pseudoscience of simplification and abstraction: "rationalization" as explaining away and covering up. 2. Kant responded to the sensationalistic idea of experience with the theory that Reason is a faculty of organizing the chaotic details of experience through a priori fixed concepts as categories. Effects in developing absolutism of thought and action in Germany.

III.

Recent Ideas of Experience and Reason. 1. Modern psychology has destroyed the sensational notion by bringing out, under biological influence, the active and motor factors in experience. Experience is doing, trying, and sensations are clews to adjustive behavior which modifies the environment. Experimental method has destroyed ancient empiricism by emphasizing projection and invention instead of accumulations from the past. Reason thus becomes Intelligence—the power of using past experience to shape and transform future experience. It is constructive and creative.

LECTURE VI

THE RECONSTRUCTION AS AFFECTING LOGIC

The problem of logical theory is important because it involves the question of the possibility of *intelligent method* in determining man's attitude toward his environment, both natural and social. Logic has to be rescued from abstract formalism on one side and from sterile epistemology on the other. Reconstruction emphasizes:

I.

The Connection of Thinking with Behavior. 1. Thinking originates from problems and perplexities, and these arise in conflicts. The intellectual as distinct from the emotional solution of conflicts involves a technique of observation, hypothesis forming and testing, ratiocination, etc. 2. The function of thinking is to develop methods of dealing with specific situations; the "idea" is a hypothetical plan of action to be tested by consequences. 3. Science or disinterested inquiry is an indispensable form of practise; meaning of thinking for thinking's sake.

II.

Inductive and Deductive Aspects of Method. Their traditional separation resulted from the traditional separation of experience and reason; hence they are now to be treated as mutually complementary. 1. Induction comes at the beginning of a complete inquiry, for experimental observation is needed to analyze the conditions which constitute a problem, and also to test the theory or hypothesis. 2. Deduction is indispensable as the intermediate step of developing an intelligent method. Abstraction liberates; generalization extends and applies; system, classification, prepares an orderly set of instrumentalities, ready in advance for dealing with emergencies as they arise.

III.

The Conception of Truth. This is a consequence rather than a foundation of other logical features. From the instrumental character of reflection it follows that only theories, ideas, can be true or false, and can be true or false not in themselves but in their application or use. The mark of consistency has to do with the deductive development which works out an applicable conception; correspondence is practical, not epistemological.

LECTURE VII

THE RECONSTRUCTION AS AFFECTING ETHICS AND EDUCATION I.

Goods and Ends are Specific and Active, not General and Static. 1. Each situation requiring action has its own good depending upon its peculiar needs and conditions. Comprehensive and general ends are of value as instruments of better insight into these specific situations; similarly, principles and standards are tools of analysis and understanding, rather than direct rules of conduct. The effect of the doctrine of the plurality of unique goods is to increase responsibility of intelligence; to decrease formalism, moral dogmatism and Phariseeism. 2. Ends and goods are within each situation, not external. An aim or purpose is a working hypothesis for directing the development of a situation, and is tested by consequences. Hence ends themselves are developing, not fixed. An ideal is a sense of the possibilities of a situation, and is of value only as inspiring action and directing for ameliorating its evils; meliorism as compared with optimism and pessimism. Happiness is found not in possession or fixed attainment, but in the active process of striving, overcoming and succeeding; failures are to be turned to account, and are not incompatible with moral happiness.

II.

Value and Defects of Utilitarianism. It has the merits and defects of a transition from one point of view to another. It made the end and good, natural and social, and subordinated law to ends. But in resolving happiness into a mass of pleasures it was made something fixed and uniform in quality, and something to be acquired and possessed. Thus utilitarianism emphasized security of acquisition and possession rather than power and security in creative achievement.

III.

Effect on Education. Education comes to be regarded, accordingly, as not only the method by which moral and social ends are realizable, but as identical with the end, namely, growth and devel-

opment. The purpose and test of social institutions is their educative effect, while education, in its narrower sense, becomes the primary method of social progress.

LECTURE VIII

RECONSTRUCTION AS AFFECTING SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

From the conclusion that the moral test of institutions is their educative effect there follow other conclusions of importance for social philosophy.

T

Relation of Individual and Social. The three historic theories of subordination of individual, subordination of social, and "organic" relationship suffer from the same error. They regard individual or social as fixed, given ready-made, instead of as developing and therefore as objects to be continuously worked out. When the individual self is treated as isolated and fixed, social arrangements can only be external means to its pleasures or possessions. But in fact institutions, legislation, administration, etc., are necessary to the release and operation of the capacities that form the individual. Society also means not a fixed organization, but reciprocal and growing sharing or communication of experience. Organization is subordinate to association. The political state is only one of a number of forms of association, each having its distinctive value. The state is instrumental rather than final,

II.

Relation of Rights and Duties, or Freedom and Law. Neither is ultimate, because both are conditions of effective furtherance of a community of experiences, of common ends and values. Unless all the capacities of the individual are liberated and used, society is static and impoverished. Personality develops only through assuming of responsibility, and responsibility is limited except as persons have a share in deciding the matters that are of ultimate importance at the given time. Law is a statement of the order upon which fruitful association depends. British "Individualism" made liberty an end in itself, and German Political Philosophy made Law and the State absolute.

III.

Religious Aspect of Reconstruction. As the changes described take deeper hold on emotional disposition and imagination, they get a religious coloring; till this happens, the classic philosophy will seem to have the advantage in ideality. Religious value of personality and of the community; place of Nature.